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THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A WEAPON TO
COMBAT HOMOPHOBIA IN MILITARY ON-
CAMPUS RECRUITING
I. INTRODUCTION
Each fall and spring, professionally dressed students hurry across
the campuses of most California universities to job interviews. Students
obtain these interviews through their schools' Career Placement Centers,
which act as a link between university students and both private and
public sector employers.' Many Career Placement Centers offer work-
shops on effective interviewing and resume writing. More importantly,
however, these centers coordinate the interviews which bring employers
to campuses in order to offer employment to students.2
When scanning the lists of interviewing employers, students often
find that the United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines have
been scheduled to conduct on-campus interviews. 3 Gay and lesbian stu-
dents, however, may refrain from submitting their resumes to these em-
ployers because of the military's well-known policy of discrimination
against homosexuals.4 Although courts have held that the military may
1. See GOLDEN GATE UNIV., PUB. No. 4, BULLETIN 42 (1990); 30 UNIVERSrrY OF
CAL., HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT 20 (1990); UNIVERSITY OF CAL., Los
ANGELES, PUB. No. 4, SCHOOL OF LAW 39 (1990).
2. See GOLDEN GATE UNIV., supra note 1, at 42; LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIV., PUB.
No. 3, LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN 43 (1988); 31 STANFORD UNIV., PUB. No. 95, BUL-
LETIN 47 (1990); 80 UNIVERSrrY OF CAL., BERKELEY, PUB. No. 16, BOALT HALL SCHOOL
OF LAW 17 (1986); 29 UNivERsrrY OF CAL., DAVIS, PUB. No. 4, SCHOOL OF LAW 20 (1989);
UNIVERSITY OF CAL., Los ANGELES, supra note 1, at 39.
3. See L.A. Times, Feb. 21, 1991, at A9, col. 3 (studentprotest planned at Occidental
College's military recruiting center); Nat'l L.J., Dec. 31, 1990-Jan. 7, 1991, at 17, col. 1
(schools discussed barring military from on-campus interview programs); San Francisco
Chron., Oct. 12, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (Boalt Hall law students wore pins to protest military
recruiting on campus).
4. The military's exclusionary policy is explained as follows:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military
environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their state-
ments, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs
the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such members ad-
versely affects the ability of the Military Services [1] to maintain discipline, good
order, and morale; [2] to foster mutual trust and confidence among servicemembers;
[3] to ensure the integrity of the system of rank and command; [4] to facilitate assign-
ment and worldwide deployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and
work under close conditions affording minimal privacy; [5] to recruit and retain
members of the Military Services; [6] to maintain the public acceptability of military
service; and [7] to prevent breaches of military security.
32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(H)(1)(a) (1990).
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lawfully discriminate against homosexuals,' the question remains open
whether California universities impermissibly discriminate against gays
and lesbians by allowing the military to participate in on-campus recruit-
ing programs. In California, business establishments must provide "full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services"
to all persons within the jurisdiction of the state.' California's Unruh
Civil Rights Act7 (the Unruh Act) protects all persons, including gays
and lesbians' from arbitrary discrimination.9 Federal courts in Califor-
nia, however, have upheld the military's policy barring gays and lesbians
from service. 10 A necessary premise underlying these holdings is that
state laws attempting to prohibit military discrimination are preempted
by military regulations.' 1
This Comment argues that California universities that allow the mil-
itary to participate in career placement programs violate the Unruh Act.
It first explains the broad interpretation that California courts have given
the Unruh Act. It then discusses United States v. City of Philadelphia,
12
the one case which has examined whether state and local anti-discrimina-
tion laws may bar military recruiters from college campuses. This Com-
ment argues that the City of Philadelphia court erred in holding that
state and local anti-discrimination laws are preempted by federal law. 3
The Comment examines the relationship between military recruiters and
universities and concludes that this type of cooperation is barred by the
Unruh Act. It demonstrates that universities are bound by the Unruh
Act and that they violate it by providing unequal services to homosexual
5. See, eg., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 575
(9th Cir. 1990); Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625, 627 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991). The Unruh Act reads in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other
physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever.
Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
9. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 75, 707 P.2d 212, 214, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 150, 152 (1985).
10. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575; Pruitt, 659 F. Supp. at 627.
11. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575; Pruitt, 659 F. Supp. at 627; U.S. CONsT. art. VI,
cl. 2.
12. 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1983).
13. Generally, federal law preempts state law in one of three ways: (1) Congress expressly
preempts state law, English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990); (2) a state law
regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclu-
sively, id.; or (3) a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress, ines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
(Vol. 24:1333
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students. Finally, this Comment proposes that California universities
should voluntarily stop their unlawful practices or face potential liability.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Legislative History of the Unruh Civil Rights Act
In The Civil Rights Cases, 4 the United States Supreme Court inval-
idated the public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, which guaranteed that all persons within the United States should
be entitled to the "full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, ad-
vantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theaters, and other places of public amusement .... .",I Many
states reacted by enacting their own public accommodations statutes.x6
California enacted its original public accommodations law in 1897,17
which prohibited discrimination in a number of enumerated establish-
ments 8 and, more generally, in "all other places of public accommoda-
tion and amusement."' 9 The California Supreme Court held that
although the statute was a derogation of the common law, it was to be
liberally construed to effect its objectives.20
California courts limited the scope of the public accommodations
statute in the late 1950s.21 In a series of cases, courts held that the
phrase "all other places" only encompassed places similar to those al-
ready enumerated in the statute.22 Consequently, the courts exempted a
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 335, 336. The Supreme Court
overturned these provisions, holding that the federal Constitution does not protect persons
from the acts of private individuals. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25.
16. Comment, The Unruh Civil Rights AcL" An Uncertain Guarantee, 31 UCLA L. REv.
443, 445 (1983). Though states' definitions of public accommodations differ, establishments
such as hotels, taverns, restaurants, and recreational areas open to the public, are usually
viewed as public accommodations. Id. at 448 n.28. By 1909, 18 states had enacted public
accommodations statutes. Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for
Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CHi. L. REV. 363, 405 (1953).
17. Act of Mar. 13, 1897, ch. 108, 1897 Cal. Stat. 137 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 51 (West Supp. 1991)). The original act read in part: "[A]ll citizens within the jurisdiction of
this State shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating-houses, barber-shops, bath-houses, theaters, skat-
ing-rinks, and all other places of public accommodation or amusement.... ." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110, 113, 180 P.2d 321, 323 (1947).
21. See Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 338 P.2d 633
(1959) (private school exempted from coverage of public accommodations law); Coleman v.
Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (1957) (dentist's office exempted from
coverage of public accommodations law).
22. E.g., Reed, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 889, 338 P.2d at 635; Coleman, 147 Cal. App.
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cemetery association,2 3 a dentist's office24 and a professional school2"
from the coverage of the public accommodations statute. In response to
the public objection to these decisions, the California legislature revised
the statute in 1959.26 As amended, the new statute, known as the Unruh
Civil Rights Act, broadened the scope of the public accommodations
law.27 The change made the statute applicable to all business establish-
ments, as opposed to public accommodations only, and it reflected the
legislature's intent to broaden the coverage of the law.28
Since the 1959 amendment, California courts have construed the
Unruh Act liberally to effect the legislative purposes of preventing arbi-
trary discrimination and promoting justice.29 In determining what types
of business establishments fall under the Unruh Act, courts have inter-
preted the legislature's choice of the words "all" and "of every kind
whatsoever" as indicating its intent that the phrase be interpreted as
broadly as reasonably possible.30 At least one court has viewed this
wording as indicative of a legislative intent to include all private and
public groups or organizations that might reasonably be found to consti-
tute any type of business establishment.31 The California Supreme Court
expressly recognized the legislative intent underlying the Unruh Act as a
desire to banish discriminatory practices from California's community
2d Supp. at 834, 305 P.2d at 1021; Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App.
328, 329, 278 P.2d 945, 946 (1955).
23. Long, 130 Cal. App. 2d at 329, 278 P.2d at 946.
24. Coleman, 147 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 834-35, 305 P.2d at 1021.
25. Reed, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 890, 338 P.2d at 636.
26. See Unruh Civil Rights Act, ch. 1866, § 1, 1959 Cal. Stat. 4424, 4424 (current version
at CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991)); see also Comment, supra note 16, at 450-51
(explaining how public pressed for amendment of the law).
27. The Unruh Act, in 1959, provided in pertinent part: "All citizens within the jurisdic-
tion of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or
national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privi-
leges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 51 (West 1959) (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991)).
The statute was named after Jesse Unruh, an influential state assemblyperson who later
became speaker of the California Assembly from 1961 to 1968. See N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1987,
at B6, col. 1. Jesse Unruh was appointed California State Treasurer in 1974 and died in 1987.
Id.
28. See Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 84, 707 P.2d 212, 219, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 150, 157 (1985); In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31
(1970).
29. See Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 76, 707 P.2d at 219, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 157; Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 727, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 334
(1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
30. See Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78, 707 P.2d at 215, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 153; Burks v. Poppy
Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468, 370 P.2d 313, 315-16, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 611-12 (1962).
31. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 79, 707 P.2d at 216, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
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life.32 As a result, the Unruh Act has been held applicable to both
profit 33 and non-profit entities.
34
B. Construction of the Unruh Act
California courts have read the Unruh Act with great deference to
its underlying policy of preventing discrimination. 35 The following cases
illustrate how far the courts have been willing to extend the coverage of
the Unruh Act with respect to: (1) the classes of persons protected; (2)
the types of businesses bound; and, (3) the types of services that must be
provided equally.
1. The protected classes
Prior to the 1959 amendment expanding the coverage of California's
public accommodations statute,36 the California Supreme Court inter-
preted the statute as protecting classes other than those listed on its face.
In Stoumen v. Reilly,37 the court decided that homosexuals were pro-
tected from arbitrary discrimination under the public accommodations
law although there was no precise language in the statute referring to
homosexuals as a protected minority.38 The plaintiff in Stoumen was the
proprietor of a gay bar.39 The State Board of Equalization had sus-
pended the plaintiff's license to sell alcohol' because he kept a "disor-
derly house." The "disorderly house" concept was based upon the fact
that homosexuals patronized the bar and used it as a meeting place.41
The court held that the plaintiff's liquor license was wrongly revoked
because the public accommodations law prohibited proprietors from ex-
cluding or ejecting patrons except for good cause.42 The mere fact that
the patrons were gay was an insufficient basis under the Unruh Act for a
32. Id. at 76, 707 P.2d at 214, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
33. Burks, 57 Cal. 2d at 468, 370 P.2d at 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
34. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796, 662 P.2d 427, 431, 191
Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1983).
35. See Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 75-76, 707 P.2d at 214, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52; Burks, 57
Cal. 2d at 468, 370 P.2d at 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
36. Unruh Civil Rights Act, ch. 1866, § 1, 1959 Cal. Stat. 4424, 4424 (current version at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991)).
37. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
38. See id. at 716, 234 P.2d at 971.
39. Id. at 715, 234 P.2d at 970.
40. Id. at 714-15, 234 P.2d at 970.
41. Id at 715, 234 P.2d at 970.
42. Id. at 716, 234 P.2d at 971. The court explained that "mere proof of [homosexual]
patronage, without proof of immoral or illegal acts on the premises" was insufficient to show
that the plaintiff kept a disorderly house. Id. Presumably, proof of immoral or illegal acts
would have constituted good cause for suspension of the liquor license. Id. A customer's
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proprietor to refuse a customer service.4" Because the proprietor could
not refuse to serve customers based on their sexual orientation, the state
could not revoke the plaintiff's license for not ejecting his gay custom-
ers.' Accordingly, the court granted a writ of mandate directing the
board to set aside its suspension of the liquor license."5
In 1970, the California Supreme Court again illustrated its commit-
ment toward expanding the scope of groups protected by the Unruh Act
in the landmark case, In re Cox.' In Cox, Theodore Cox was arrested
for violating a municipal trespass ordinance by remaining on business
premises after being asked to leave by a mall security guard.47 The secur-
ity guard had asked Cox and his companion to leave based on their ap-
pearances: Cox and his friend had long hair and wore motorcycle
clothing.48 The court held that a business establishment could promul-
gate reasonable deportment regulations as long as such regulations were
rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided. 9
Factors considered by the court as being acceptable for deportment in-
cluded whether customers had damaged property, injured others, or
otherwise disrupted the business."0 The court in Cox made it clear, how-
ever, that the shopping center did not have an absolute power arbitrarily
to eject would-be customers from its premises.51
In reaching this conclusion, the Cox court traced the legislative his-
tory of the Unruh Act.5" At the time, the Unruh Act only expressly
prohibited discrimination on the basis of color, race, religion, ancestry
and national origin. 3 The court, however, found the listed categories to
be an illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list of the types of classes cov-
ered by the Unruh Act.54 The court also rested its conclusion on the
reasoning set forth in Stoumen. It found, therefore, that the legislature
homosexuality, however, would not constitute sufficient cause for a proprietor to refuse ser-
vice. Id.
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Id. at 718, 234 P.2d at 972.
46. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 210-11, 474 P.2d 992, 994-95, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26-27 (1970).
47. Id. at 210, 474 P.2d at 994, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
48. Id. at 217-18, 474 P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
49. Ia at 217, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
50. Id
51. Id. at 209, 474 P.2d at 993, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
52. Id. at 213-16, 474 P.2d at 996-99, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 28-31.
53. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (West 1970) (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West
Supp. 1991)). Since 1959, the legislature has added sex, blindness and other physical disability
to the list of expressly protected classes. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991).
54. Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 212, 474 P.2d at 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
55. Id. at 214, 474 P.2d at 997, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (citing Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 3d
1338 [Vol. 24:1333
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intended to prohibit all arbitrary discrimination by business establish-
ments.5 6 The broad reading which courts have afforded the Unruh Act
has, therefore, been construed as protecting gays and lesbians from arbi-
trary discrimination.17 Relying largely on Stoumen and Cox, one court
found it clear that gays and lesbians were protected under the Unruh
Act.
5 8
2. Establishments bound by the Unruh Act
The Unruh Act is binding upon "all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever." 9 Thus, for the Unruh Act to apply, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant is a business establishment. 6° What consti-
tutes a business establishment, however, has been the subject of much
judicial interpretation. In Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz,61 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, reversing the appellate court,62 held that the
Boys' Club violated the Unruh Act by denying membership to girls.63 In
deciding that the Boys' Club was a business establishment, as defined in
the Unruh Act, the court relied on the legislature's desire to banish arbi-
trary discrimination from the state.6" This reliance led the court to inter-
pret the Unruh Act's coverage as broadly as reasonably possible.65 The
court rejected the Boys' Club's assertion that it was exempt from the
Unruh Act because it was a non-profit business.66 The Isbister court reit-
erated its intent to read the Unruh Act broadly, noting that the legisla-
ture had never added any exemption or exception to the category of
business establishments covered by the Act.67 Furthermore, the court
held that the Unruh Act was not preempted by the congressional charter
713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951)). See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Stoumen case.
56. Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 216, 474 P.2d at 999, 290 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
57. See Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982).
58. Id. at 5, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 163. In Hubert, the court held that a landlord violated the
Unruh Act by evicting a quadriplegic tenant and his lesbian attendant because she was gay and
he had gay friends. Id.
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
60. Id.; see Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d
712, 727, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 334 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
61. 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985).
62. The appellate court held that the Unruh Act did not apply to non-commercial entities
such as charitable organizations, fraternal societies and community service organizations. Is-
bister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 144 Cal. App. 3d 338, 344, 192 Cal. Rptr. 560, 567 (1983),
vacated, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P. 2d 212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985).
63. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 91, 707 P.2d at 224-25, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
64. Id. at 75-76, 707 P.2d at 214, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 82-83, 707 P.2d at 218, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
67. Id. at 84, 707 P.2d at 219, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
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of the Boys' Club which stated the club's purpose was to "promote the
health, social, educational, vocational, and character development of
boys."6 The court found that allowing girls into the club would not
necessarily frustrate this goal.69
One California appellate court has held that even the Boy Scouts of
America could be found to be a business establishment under the Unruh
Act.7 0  In Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of
America,71 the plaintiff, who had been a member of the Boy Scouts in
good standing for five years, was expelled because he was gay and hence,
not a good moral example for younger scouts.
72
The court held that the Boy Scouts of America fell under the Unruh
Act's definition of business establishment because "the Legislature's in-
tent [was] to use the term in the broadest sense reasonably possible" in-
cluding "all commercial and noncommercial entities open to and serving
the general public."'73 The Curran court examined the legislative history
of the act and its subsequent judicial interpretations to conclude that the
term "business establishment" was to be read expansively.74 The court
also held that exclusion of the plaintiff on the basis of his homosexuality
was not permissible under the Unruh Act." The Unruh Act's primary
purpose was seen by this court as compelling "recognition of the equality
of all persons in the right to the particular service offered by an organiza-
tion or entity covered by the act."
'76
The Boy Scouts claimed that enforcing the Unruh Act against it
would violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
77
The Curran court, however, rejected the Boy Scouts contention that the
congressional charter which formed the organization in 1916 preempted
an Unruh Act claim.78 The court relied on a provision of the charter
stating that Boy Scout regulations were not to conflict with the laws of
68. Id. at 90 n.21, 707 P.2d at 224 n.21, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 162 n.21 (emphasis added). The
court found that this charter did not display an unambiguous "'congressional intent to pre-
empt."' Id. (quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-50 (1971)).
69. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 90 n.21, 707 P.2d at 224 n.21, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 162 n.21.
70. Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 732-33, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
71. 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205
(1984).
72. Id. at 718, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
73. Id at 732-33, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
74. Id. at 727-33, 195 Cal. Rptr. 334-39.
75. Id. at 734, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
76. Id. at 733, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
77. Id at 734, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
78. Id.
[Vol. 24:1333
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the United States or any state.Y9
3. Construction of unequal services
To sustain an Unruh Act challenge, in addition to showing that the
plaintiff is a member of a protected class and that the defendant's estab-
lishment is a business, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant provided
unequal services, facilities, advantages or privileges. 0  Rolon v.
Kulwitzky 81 illustrates how California courts view this equality provision
as covering all aspects of services.8 2 Rolon involved two lesbians who
went to a Los Angeles restaurant and requested to sit in one of the semi-
private booths.13 The hostess offered to serve them at another table, but
refused to seat them in the requested booth due to the restaurant's policy
of saving the seating in these booths for opposite sex couples only. 4
The plaintiff sought an injunction to prohibit the restaurant from
continuing its discriminatory seating policy." The trial court refused to
grant the injunction.86 The appellate court reversed on the ground that
the restaurant's policy violated both the Unruh Act and a Los Angeles
municipal ordinance.87 The appellate court stated that it was "unable to
conceive of any conduct that the restaurant could reasonably fear might
offend the sensitivities of the most prudish patron."88 Thus, under the
Unruh Act, businesses must provide all aspects of their services without
arbitrary discrimination.
The Supreme Court of California also addressed the issue of equal
services in Koire v. Metro Car Wash.89 In that case, the court held that
several car washes and one night club violated the Unruh Act by offering
promotional sex-based discounts to women.90 The defendants had adver-
tised promotions offering lower prices on certain days for women.91 The
male plaintiff visited the establishments during the promotions and asked
79. Id Because the charter mandates that the Boy Scouts' regulations not conflict with
the laws of the United States or any state, the court held that this policy could not preempt the
application of the Unruh Act. Id.; see 36 U.S.C. § 22 (1988).
80. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991).
81. 153 Cal. App. 3d 288, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984).
82. See id. at 292, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
83. Id. at 290, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
84. Id. The restaurant's policy would have also excluded two heterosexual men or an
opposite sex couple with a child from service in these booths. Id.
85. Id. at 292, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
86. Id. at 291, 200 Cal. Rptr at 218.
87. Id. at 291-93, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
88. Id. at 292, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
89. 40 Cal. 3d 24, 707 P.2d 195, 219 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1985).
90. Id. at 39, 707 P.2d at 204, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
91. Id. at 27, 707 P.2d at 195, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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to be charged the same discount prices as were offered to females. 92 The
court emphasized that the Unruh Act was not limited to barring exclu-
sionary practices; it guarantees equal treatment of persons in all aspects
of the services provided by a business. 93 The court found that differential
pricing, based on sex, reinforces harmful stereotypes as well as violating
the spirit of the Unruh Act.
94
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Unruh Civil Rights Act Is Not Preempted by Federal Law
To date, only one case has explored whether a state anti-discrimina-
tion law can be used to prohibit the military from interviewing on college
campuses.95 In 1986, the Third Circuit held in United States v. City of
Philadelphia 9 6 that a municipal ordinanqe barring discrimination could
not be used to prevent Temple University Law School from coordinating
student interviews with the military.97 The court held that the ordinance
was preempted by federal law.98 The court further held that state or
local laws which bar universities from cooperating with military
recruiters conflicted with the congressional policy of encouraging such
cooperative efforts.99
The ordinance reviewed in City of Philadelphia is similar to the Un-
ruh Act because it prohibits limiting services offered to groups or individ-
uals because of their sexual orientation."o In order for the Unruh Act to
bar California universities from participating with military recruiters,
therefore, the Act must avoid federal preemption.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 29, 707 P.2d at 197, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
94. Id. at 34-35, 707 P.2d at 200-01, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
95. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986).
96. 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 88-89. The court concluded that "the Order conflicts with a clearly discernible
Congressional policy concerning military recruitment on the campuses of this nation's colleges
and universities. It follows, then, that the Commission cannot enforce the Ordinance against
Temple with respect to the latter's decision to make its placement facilities available to the
J.A.G. Corps." Id.
98. Id. at 87. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 117-51 and accom-
panying text.
99. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 87.
100. The court found that it is unlawfil for any employment agency to follow a policy
which limits the employment opportunities of individuals or groups because of sexual orienta-
tion. Id. at 84 n.2 (citing section 9-1103(A)(2) of the Philadelphia Code). Temple University
conceded that it acted as an employment agency as defined under the Code. Id. The Unruh
Act has also been construed as prohibiting the provision of unequal services to persons based
upon their sexual orientation. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
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1. United States v. City of Philadelphia
In City of Philadelphia, two Temple University Law School students
sought interviews with the Judge Advocate General Corps (J.A.G.),
which represents the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines."" The Ca-
reer Placement Center at Temple University Law School refused to
schedule the students for interviews with the military. 2 The students
filed a complaint with the Philadelphia Human Relations Commission
alleging that the law school had violated a city ordinance barring dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.'0 3
The Philadelphia ordinance prohibited employment agencies from
denying or limiting the employment opportunities of any individual or
group based on sexual orientation."° The Human Relations Commis-
sion (the Commission), after finding that the placement services at Tem-
ple University Law School constituted an employment agency, held that
the law school violated the ordinance by allowing the military to inter-
view on campus.10 5 The Commission ordered the law school to cease
and desist from allowing the military to use its Career Placement
Center. 106 The Commission found that by allowing the military to inter-
view oncampus, Temple University Law School had followed a policy
that limited the employment opportunities of its gay and lesbian
students. 107
The United States then filed a complaint in the district court alleg-
ing that the city ordinance violated the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution.0 8 The district court granted summary judgment for
the United States and Temple University on the grounds that the Com-
mission's order attempted to do indirectly what it did not have the power
to do directly."'° In other words, the court interpreted the city's action
as a plan to force the military to change its recruiting policy. 10
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the Philadelphia ordinance
101. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 83.
102. Id. at 84.
103. Id. Section 9-1103(A)(2) of the Philadelphia Code states in pertinent part that it shall
be an unlawful employment practice "[flor any . . . employment agency . . . to establish,
announce or follow a policy of denying or limiting ... the employment... opportunities, of
any individual or group because of. . . sexual orientation." Id. at n.2 (citing section 9-
1103(A)(2) of the Philadelphia Code).
104. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 84 n.4.
105. Id. at 84.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 84-85.
109. Id. at 85.
110. Id.
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conflicted with a discernible congressional policy.111 Congress had in-
tended to promote cooperation between the Department of Defense and
universities.1 ' The court also found that the J.A.G.'s access to college
recruiting programs was critical to its ability to conduct intensive recruit-
ing campaigns. 13 To support this interpretation of congressional intent,
the court relied on a public law that states: "'No part of the funds appro-
priated... for the Department of Defense... may be used at any institu-
tion of higher learning if... recruiting personnel of any of the Armed
Forces of the United States are being barred by the policy of such institu-
tion from the premises of the institution.' "114 The court found that this
law had only one reasonable purpose: Congress considered access to col-
lege and university employment facilities by military recruiters to be a
matter of paramount importance." 5 Thus, the court found that Con-
gress viewed such access as an integral part of the military's effort to
conduct intensive recruiting campaigns to obtain enlistments.
11 6
2. Analysis of the City of Philadelphia court's reasoning
a. interpretation of congressional purpose
Fundamentally, preemption is a question of congressional intent.
1 1 7
Congress may easily preempt state law if it expresses such an intent.1 8
In City of Philadelphia, the circuit court found that Congress did not
expressly preempt state law regarding employment discrimination.' 1 9
Instead, Congress expressly contemplated that states would exercise their
traditional regulatory powers to prohibit employment discrimination. 20
The City of Philadelphia court, however, held that Congress exhibited
the requisite intent required to preempt Philadelphia's human rights
ordinance. 121
In determining congressional intent, the court relied on its finding
that Congress considered access to college and university employment
111. Id. at 87.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 86 (quoting Act of Sept. 26, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-436, § 606(a), 88 Stat. 734,
740).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 86-87.
117. English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275.
118. See Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
659 F.2d 903, 919 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Dev. Comxn'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
119. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86 n.5.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 88.
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facilities by military recruiters to be a matter of paramount impor-
tance.122 The court rested this finding on two factors: (1) section 606(a)
of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1973,123 which cut
off defense funds to schools which do not participate with military
recruiting;12 and, (2) the court's finding that military access to colleges
and universities is integral to conducting intensive recruiting
campaigns.
12 5
These two factors, however, do not support a finding of "paramount
importance." First, section 606(a) fails to indicate that Congress viewed
military recruiter access to college campuses as crucial. If Congress felt
that this access were of paramount importance, it would have required
all colleges and universities to accommodate military recruiters rather
than singling out only secondary schools for mandatory cooperation with
military recruitment programs. 12 6 The City of Philadelphia court relied
upon the testimony of two military recruiters, who stated that on-campus
recruiting was the most effective way to fill important positions.
127
Based primarily on their testimony, the court reasoned that Congress
deemed military recruiter access to college campuses to be of paramount
importance. 128 Thus, the court inferred that on-campus recruiting was of
paramount importance because of its effectiveness. 129 If Congress actu-
ally felt that this access were of paramount importance, however, it
would not have allowed universities to bar military recruiters from cam-
pus for any reason. 130 The only universities that cannot bar the military
are those that desire to receive continued defense funding. 131 Conse-
quently, the underlying purpose of the law is not to require universities to
allow the military to interview on campus, but rather to ensure that those
122. Id. at 86.
123. Act of Sept. 26, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-436, § 606(a), 86 Stat. 734, 740.
124. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86. Many universities receive money from the De-
partment of Defense to fund educational and research programs. H.R. REp. No. 1149, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1972).
125. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86.
126. See id., 798 F.2d at 88 n.10; Act of Sept. 8, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-342, § 302(d), 94
Stat. 1083, 1084 (1980) ("secondary educational institutions in the United States, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories of the United States should cooperate with the
Armed Forces by allowing recruiting personnel access to such institutions" (emphasis added)).
127. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 87.
128. Id. at 86-87.
129. Id.
130. The law does not require universities to comply-it merely threatens to take away a
part of their funding if they do not cooperate. Act of Sept. 26, 1972, § 606(a). If a college has
the power to decide not to cooperate with the military, a decision that could be based on the
military's discrimination against gays and lesbians, then clearly it is within the power of the
state to do so.
131. See Act of Sept. 26, 1972, § 606(a).
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institutions that receive defense funds allow the Department of Defense
to use their recruiting services. The policy simply prohibits an institution
from taking money from the Department of Defense while denying it
access. Even if this law were intended to promote cooperation between
the military and universities, it still only speaks as to those schools that
receive defense funding. 132
In finding that Congress viewed military access to on-campus inter-
views as essential to an intensive recruiting campaign, the court in City of
Philadelphia exaggerated an existing interest. 133 Congress has issued a
directive instructing the branches of the military to conduct intensive
recruiting campaigns to obtain enlistments. 134 This directive, however,
speaks in general terms and does not define access to college campuses as
an essential element of a recruiting campaign. 35 The court interpreted
both the directive to recruit intensively, and Congress's policy of cutting
defense funds to schools barring military recruiting as establishing Con-
gress's view that military access to college recruiting services was of para-
mount importance.136 Congress, however, does not cut defense funding
at schools that discontinue their Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
programs, which serve as a source of new Army officers."37 If the under-
lying purpose of section 606(a) is to promote the military's intensive
recruiting program, then the discontinuation of the ROTC at a university
should also cause its defense funds to be cut. 38 Thus, the court's inter-
pretation of the intent of section 606(a) is inconsistent with the plain
language of the law.
132. See id. The focus of the legislation is on the appropriation of funds to universities.
The law states that "[n]o part of the funds appropriated ... for the Department of Defense or
any of the Armed Forces may be used at any institution of higher learning if... [military
recruiters] are being barred by the policy of such institution .... ." Id. There is no language in
the Act to support the City of Philadelphia court's interpretation that the law was meant to
foster a cooperative atmosphere between the military and universities. See City of Philadel-
phia, 798 F.2d at 87.
Because the language only speaks to those institutions that receive defense funding, even
under the City of Philadelphia standard, local or state laws should not be preempted if they are
applied to universities not funded by the Department of Defense.
133. See City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86.
134. Act of Sept. 8, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1114(b)(1)(A), 96 Stat. 718, 749 (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1988)).
135. See 10 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1988). Compare Act of Sept. 8, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-342,
§ 302(d), 94 Stat. 1083, 1084 (Congress mandated military access to secondary schools) with
H.R. REP. No. 1149, supra note 124, at 79-80 (stressing that universities have absolute right
to determine whether to permit military recruiters on campus).
136. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86.
137. See Act of Sept. 26, 1972, § 606(a).
138. See Kosova, ROTC Ya Later, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 19, 1990, at 24, 24 (Army relies
on ROTC for more than 70 percent of new officers).
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If the actual intent of the statute is to promote cooperation between
universities and the military and to ensure the military's ability to recruit
intensively, the law falls short of both of these goals. First, universities
that do not receive any funds from the defense department probably do
not have the financial incentive to cooperate with military recruiting.
Moreover, this policy could induce universities not receiving defense
funds to cancel their cooperation with the military in the hope of secur-
ing defense funding for the restoration of that cooperation. Second, in-
tense recruiting takes place in ROTC programs; 139 these programs,
however, are not within the scope of section 606(a).140 If Congress
thought that recruiting on college campuses was of paramount impor-
tance, then defense funding should also be cut from universities that can-
cel their ROTC programs.
Interpreting the purpose of section 606(a) more narrowly, however,
avoids these inconsistencies. The congressional intent should be read as
simply placing conditions upon a university's receipt of funds from the
defense department. The focus of this interpretation is the appropriation
of funds, thus, section 606(a) should affect only those schools that receive
the funds. This interpretation would not induce schools that allow the
military to interview without receiving funds to drop the programs in
order to receive funding. 141 This construction also avoids the second in-
consistency. Under this narrower construction, the silence of section
139. Id.
140. See Act of Sept. 26, 1972, § 606(a).
141. This interpretation also allows for a reconciliation of two divergent statements in the
House Report. "[The] national interest is best served by colleges and universities which pro-
vide for the full spectrum of opportunity for various career fields, including the military field
through the Reserve Officers Training Corps program, and by the opportunity for students to
talk to all recruiting sources, including military recruiters." H.R. REP. No. 1149, supra note
124, at 79. While this statement seems to support the City of Philadelphia court's interpreta-
tion that the legislation was passed to encourage cooperation between universities and the
military, it seems squarely refuted on the same page of the House Report. The report noted
that each college and university retained the "absolute right to determine whether it desires to
have any association with the military forces of its country, and this includes the right to
determine whether it desires to permit military recruiters... on its campus." Id. at 79-80. If
Congress's true purpose was to promote cooperation, the statement that a university has the
absolute right to sever its association with the military undercuts that purpose.
When read together, however, these statements both support the narrower construction of
congressional purpose. The statement concerning the national interest could reasonably be
construed, not as the promotion of military and university cooperation, but rather as a justifi-
cation for the conditioning of military funds upon the use of university placement services.
When the purpose is simply to place a condition upon the granting of funds, the statement
regarding the university's right to not associate with the military simply clarifies the univer-
sity's obligations. Universities have no obligation to allow the military to interview on campus
unless they would like to retain their defense funding. Act of Sept. 26, 1972, § 606(a).
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606(a) upon the issue of the ROTC is logical. If Congress had merely
intended to place a condition upon universities receiving defense funding,
there was no need to deprive this funding from universities that cancel
their ROTC programs.
A final factor to examine when determining congressional intent is
the historical period in which the Congress enacted section 606(a). Sec-
tion 606(a) was passed in 1972,142 near the close of the Vietnam con-
flict.143 Students across the country conducted protests and tried to oust
the military from their campuses." 4 Even if Congress intended to pre-
empt state laws, the more important question is what types of state laws
it intended to preempt.
The movement to expel the armed services in the early seventies
grew from the anti-war movement, 145 not the military's exclusionary pol-
icies regarding homosexuals. Congressional notice, therefore, was proba-
bly brought to focus because of the anti-war protests. 146 There is a
fundamental difference between kicking the military off campus because
of anti-war sentiment and doing so because of discrimination. One ra-
tionale is based on disagreement with the military's war policy, while the
other is based upon the state's strong interest in ending discrimination.
When dealing with military operations and discipline, many courts will
defer to the judgment of the military. 47 As the court in City of Philadel-
phia noted, however, states have traditionally maintained the power to
regulate employment discrimination. 141 Thus, while courts may grant
special deference to the military in the field of national security, the case
for military preemption of state law weakens when the regulated fields
have traditionally been regulated by the states.49 Unruh Act claims are
based on arbitrary discrimination-an area of law that has been directly
142. See Act of Sept. 26, 1972, § 606(a).
143. See R. LONG, VIETNAM TEN YEARS AFTER 7 (1986).
144. See Cox COMM'N, CRISIS AT COLUMBIA: REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING COMMIS-
SION APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE DISTURBANCES AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN
APRIL AND MAY 1968, at 63-75 (1968) (describing demonstrations against Reserve Officers
Training Corps and Marine recruiters).
145. See Campus Reform, LIFE, May 30, 1969, at 42, 42 (arguing that student groups com-
pelled examination of both ROTC's role on campus and classified governmental research
projects at universities).
146. See Cox COMM'N, supra note 144, at 63-75 (discussing Columbia University student
protests ignited by military action in Vietnam); Campus Reform, supra note 145, at 42 (dis-
cussing nationwide protests on college campuses spurred by Vietnam conflict).
147. North Dakota v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1986, 1999 (1990).
148. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86 n.5.
149. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-27, at 499 (2d ed. 1988) (courts
apply stricter standard for preemption when field in question has traditionally been regulated
by states).
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regulated by California since the late nineteenth century.150 If the mili-
tary is due less deference in any area, it should be here.1"'
b. standard to determine preemption
The City of Philadelphia court based its finding of federal preemp-
tion upon a standard that requires preemption of any state law that con-
fficts with a "'discernible congressional policy."' 152 This standard for
preemption originated in Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission,153 a
1943 Supreme Court case. Though still good law, the standard relied on
by the City of Philadelphia court was not invoked by the Supreme Court
in two of its most recent decisions concerning federal preemption, ren-,
dering its current force as a relevant standard tenuous at best.
154
An important factor in preemption analysis is whether the area in
question has been normally delegated to the state or to the federal gov-
ernment.155 When the area has been traditionally regulated by the states,
the court requires a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt
the state law.' 56 When the area is of national concern, usually regulated
by the federal government, the states have been accorded less defer-
ence.157 Discrimination in employment is an area traditionally regulated
by the states. 15' In two recent United States Supreme Court decisions on
preemption in areas of traditional state regulation, the Court did not util-
ize the "discernible congressional purpose" standard set forth in City of
Philadelphia. 159
In North Dakota v. United States, 16o the dispute centered around a
150. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
151. See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 202 (1962)
(contending that courts should defer to military less when protecting civil rights).
152. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 87 (quoting Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n,
318 U.S. 261, 271 (1943)).
153. 318 U.S. 261 (1943). The Court stated that the question was "whether the state's
regulation... in a matter of local concern conflicts with Congressional legislation or with any
discernible Congressional policy." Id. at 271.
154. See English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2277 (1990) (Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974 did not preempt plaintiff's state law tort action); North Dakota, 110 S. Ct. at 1994
(state's liquor reporting and labeling regulations were applicable to in-state military base and
were not preempted by federal law).
155. L. TRIBE, supra note 149, § 6-27, at 499-500.
156. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
157. See North Dakota, 110 S. Ct. at 1992 (state may not regulate use of alcohol in federal
enclave, but within area of its jurisdiction, it has virtually complete control).
158. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86 n.5. The court noted that in this instance, state or
local laws dealing with employment discrimination are only preempted if they conflict with
federal law. Id.
159. See English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275; North Dakota, 110 S. Ct. at 1994.
160. 110 S. Ct. 1986 (1990).
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North Dakota statute that required persons buying liquor from out-of-
state wholesalers to comply with reporting and labeling regulations.161
These regulations increased the military's cost of buying alcohol from
out-of-state suppliers. 162 Congress, however, had passed legislation re-
quiring the military to obtain the most advantageous commercial con-
tracts.163 The federal government argued that this law preempted the
state liquor regulations. 1' 4 The Court, however, used a two-pronged test
to determine that the state law was not preempted: (1) the law did not
regulate the federal government directly or discriminate against it; and,
(2) the law did not conflict with an affirmative command of Congress. 165
In contrast, if the North Dakota Court had invoked the City of Phil-
adelphia's "discernible congressional policy" test, it may have arrived at
a different result. Congress clearly expressed a policy favoring military
acquisition of supplies as inexpensively as possible.166 The discernible
policy was to help cut the costs of the military. 67 Nevertheless, the
Court held that the state requirements in this case were merely an indi-
rect burden, only "regulat[ing] federal activity in the sense that they
[made] it more costly for the [g]overnment to do its business."'
168
The Supreme Court also bypassed the "discernible congressional
policy" test in English v. General Electric Co. 169 In English, a whistle-
blowing employee in a nuclear fuel production facility was fired for vio-
lating a provision of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.170 The
Court held that the Energy Reorginization Act of 1974 did not preempt a
state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 7 ' The
Court noted that congressional intent to preempt must be either express
161. Id. at 1991.
162. Id.
163. See 10 U.S.C. § 2488(a) (1988) (military to procure liquor from most competitive
source).
164. North Dakota, 110 S. Ct. at 1990.
165. Id. at 1994.
166. Id. at 1990; see 10 U.S.C. § 2488(a).
167. See 10 U.S.C. § 2488(a).
168. North Dakota, 110 S. Ct. at 1994-95. A state ban on military recruiting on campus
would not prohibit the military from recruiting intensively. For example, the military could
use other avenues to reach college students. The military could advertise in campus newspa-
pers and interview interested students in hotels near campus. Recruiting without the assist-
ance of Career Placement Centers, thus, would be an indirect burden in that it would merely
increase the military's costs.
169. 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990).
170. Id. at 2273; 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988). The Energy Reorganization Act makes it
unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee, in retaliation for making complaints about
nuclear safety. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, § 210(a), 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1988).
171. English, 110 S. Ct. at 2280.
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or plainly implied in order to negate state causes of action.172 The Court
stated that the threshold for preemption of a state cause of action is the
"clear and manifest intention" of Congress.17 3 Even though allowing
state claims would decrease the incentive to report immediately hazard-
ous conditions, the Court found that Congress had not evidenced suffi-
cient intent to preclude the state cause of action.174 In addition, the
Court was reluctant to imply preemption absent actual conflict.
175
In City of Philadelphia, the circuit court conceded that employment
discrimination falls within the traditional regulatory powers of the
state. 176 It also acknowledged that when dealing with state statutes regu-
lating their internal affairs, preemption is not to be lightly inferred.177
The court, however, applied the wrong standard when it concluded that
a discernible congressional purpose could be found if Congress reason-
ably intended to preempt state law. 178 The Supreme Court has described
a more stringent test when the area to be preempted has been tradition-
ally regulated by the states: the intent to supersede state law must be
"'clear and manifest.' ,179
c. application of the "clear and manifest" standard
The court in City of Philadelphia erred when it ruled that the Phila-
delphia Human Rights Ordinance was preempted by federal law because
it interfered with a discernible congressional policy. 180 The area in ques-
tion has been traditionally regulated by the states; therefore, a court
should not find the state law preempted unless the law directly conflicts
with a federal statute or it is the "clear and manifest" purpose of Con-
gress to preserve the area for federal regulation., Section 606(a), how-
ever, is the only federal regulation in this area and is not sufficiently
comprehensive to occupy the entire field. 82 Congress has expressly rec-
172. Id. at 2275 n.5.
173. Id. at 2279.
174. Id. at 2280-81.
175. Id. at 2281. Similarly, in an Unruh Act claim, there would be no actual conflict since
complying with the state law would not require a university to violate federal law. See Act of
Sept. 26, 1972, § 606(a) (university can comply with both state and federal law by denying
access to military recruiters and refusing defense department funding).
176. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86 n.5.
177. Id. at 86.
178. Id.
179. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
180. See City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 87.
181. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
182. See id. The Rice Court found there were three instances where a "clear and manifest"
intent to preempt state law would be present. First, Congress could legislate extensively in the
June 1991] 1351
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ognized that universities and colleges have the absolute right to keep the
military from interviewing on their campuses-a right that can be in-
voked for any reason whatsoever.18 3 According to this policy, universi-
ties can exclude military recruiters from campuses for good reasons, bad
reason, or no reason at all.184 Under the City of Philadelphia standard,
however, a state may not bar military access to universities within its
borders."8 This would hold true even where the state has a legitimate
interest in prohibiting military on-campus recruiting. 18 6 Even if Con-
gress's actual purpose in passing section 606(a) was to encourage cooper-
ation between the military and universities,18 7 the legislative history lacks
sufficient clarity to pass the "clear and manifest" standard.
Under the City of Philadelphia standard, the University of Califor-
nia could exercise its absolute right to bar the military recruiters from
campus for any reason at all 1 8 Federal preemption of state law, how-
ever, would bar California from excluding military on-campus recruit-
ing-even to pursue a compelling state interest or public policy.
Following this analysis results in the University of California, an institu-
tion created by the state,18 9 possessing greater power than the state. To
avoid this incongruous result, California courts should not use the re-
laxed preemption standard set forth in City of Philadelphia.
field, leaving no room for state regulations. Id. Second, the standard would be met if the area
were a field of dominant federal interest. Id. Third, the state law would be preempted if it
were inconsistent with the objective behind the federal statute. Id.
Only the third reason could arguably favor preemption in the context of this issue. If the
federal objective were to coerce universities into cooperating with military recruiters, then
state anti-discrimination statutes barring this cooperation would be inconsistent with the fed-
eral objective. This objective, however, was not expressed by Congress. If this were the objec-
tive, the law would contain some fundamental inconsistencies. See supra notes 133-51 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these inconsistencies. By interpreting section 606(a) as
having the narrower objective of conditioning defense funding, a court would not only avoid
these inconsistencies, but would also find that the state law is not preempted. By barring
universities from assisting military recruiters, a state would not interfere with any congres-
sional objective. The Department of Defense would simply cease funding those universities
that could not aid in military recruiting. In addition, the law contains a provision allowing the
Department of Defense to continue funding those universities that do not allow military
recruiting if the university is conducting important research for national security. See Act of
Sept. 26, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92 436, § 606(a), 86 Stat. 740.
183. See H.R. REP. No. 1149, supra note 124, at 79-80.
184. See id
185. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 88-89.
186. See id. at 89.
187. See id. at 86.
188. H.R. REP. No. 1149, supra note 124, at 79-80.
189. See CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § 9.
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B. The Broad Interpretation of the Unruh Act
Plaintiffs successfully bypassing a preemption defense must then ar-
gue that universities' actions violate the Unruh Act. As the preceding
background section illustrates, California courts have read the different
clauses of the Unruh Act broadly. 190 The classes expressly protected by
the Unruh Act have been construed to be an illustrative rather than re-
strictive list.'91 Thus, although gays and lesbians are not expressly men-
tioned in the Unruh Act, courts have held that they constitute a
protected class.192 Courts have also regarded the Unruh Act as a reflec-
tion of California's strong interest in abolishing all kinds of arbitrary dis-
crimination.' 93 In addition, the courts have not hesitated to construe the
phrase "all business establishments of every kind whatsoever"' 94 as
broadly as possible. 195 Both profit and non-profit businesses and organi-
zations have been required to comply with the provisions of the Unruh
Act. Finally, one California court has held that differences in only one
aspect of a service, otherwise equally provided, violate the language and
spirit of the Unruh Act.'9 6
C. Universities Violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act by Allowing the
Military to Participate in On-Campus Interview Programs
A successful plaintiff asserting an Unruh Act violation must fall
within a class protected under the Unruh Act.197 In addition, the plain-
tiff must show: (1) the defendant is a business establishment, 19 and (2)
190. See supra notes 14-94 and accompanying text.
191. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 212, 474 P.2d 992, 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (1971).
192. See, e.g., Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 717, 234 P.2d 969, 972 (1951); Hubert v.
Williams, 133 Cal. App. Supp. 1, 5, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (1982).
193. E.g., Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 86, 707 P.2d 212, 221, 219
Cal. Rptr. 150, 159 (1985); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147
Cal. App. 3d 712, 733, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 334 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
194. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991).
195. See, e.g., Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 84, 707 P.2d at 219, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (Boys' Club
violated Unruh Act by excluding girls); O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d
790, 795, 662 P.2d 427, 430, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (1983) (condominium owners association
was business and violated Unruh Act by prohibiting residency to minors); Marina Point, Ltd.
v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 731, 640 P.2d 115, 121, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 502 (apartment com-
plex violated Unruh Act by excluding families with children from renting), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 858 (1982); Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 211, 474 P.2d at 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (shopping center
prohibited from arbitrarily excluding patron based on appearance).
196. See Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 288, 291, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217, 218 (1984).
197. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 712,
733, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 338 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984). Gays and lesbi-
ans are a protected class under the Act. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
198. Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 717, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
June 1991] 1353
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the defendant has arbitrarily discriminated against the plaintiff. 99
1. Universities are business establishments under the Unruh Act
The Unruh Act applies to "all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever," 2" except for strictly private clubs or institutions.0 1
In Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School District,2 2 a California
appellate court stated it was reasonably certain that a public school
would fall within the scope of the Unruh Act.2 3 In Sullivan, the defend-
ant high school refused to allow a disabled student to bring her service
dog to school.2' The district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, stating that a high school was not a business estab-
lishment. 20 ' The appellate court, however, reversed and found that a
public school would most likely be considered a business establishment
under the Unruh Act.20 6 The court rested its conclusion primarily on
two California Supreme Court cases, Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa
Cruz 207 and Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson. 20 8
In sbister, the court broadly construed what types of business estab-
lishments were subject to the Unruh Act.20 9 The court held that a non-
profit Boys' Club, that stood to lose substantial funding if girls were ad-
mitted, was nevertheless subject to the Unruh Act.210 Because the legis-
lature drafted no exemptions into the Unruh Act, the Isbister court was
reluctant to imply any, reasoning that the legislature knew how to draft
such exceptions when it wanted them.2 1
199. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 86, 707 P.2d 212, 221, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 150, 159 (1985).
200. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991).
201. Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 730-31, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 336. The court found that
"those with a common interest may associate exclusively with whom they please only if it is
the kind of association which was intended to be embraced within the protection afforded by
the rights of privacy and free association." Id. at 730, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 336. The argument
asserting that private clubs should be excluded from the coverage of the Act relies on individu-
als' constitutional right to freely associate. Id. The court, however, found that an organiza-
tion with no standards for admissibility and a large membership is simply too unselective to be
a private club. Id. at 731, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
202. 731 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
203. Id. at 952.
204. Id. at 949.
205. Id. at 952.
206. Id.
207. 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985).
208. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 196, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
209. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 76, 707 P.2d at 214, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 152. See supra notes 61-69
and accompanying text for a discussion of Isbister.
210. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 90, 707 P.2d at 224, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
211. Id. at 84, 707 P.2d at 219, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
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In Marina Point, the court examined the legislative history of the
Unruh Act. The Court looked to an earlier provision of the bill which
enumerated groups covered by the Unruh Act; this list had included
schools.212 Instead of using this earlier version of the act, the legislature
adopted the language "all business establishments of any kind whatso-
ever." '213 The court construed the Unruh Act, as enacted, as covering all
of the categories listed in the original proposed legislation, in addition to
categories not mentioned previously.214
On this basis, the appellate court in Sullivan, after examining the
state law, reasoned that a university should be bound by the provisions of
the Unruh Act.215 One commentator has asserted that although univer-
sities are non-profit for tax purposes, their operation is most similar to
that of private businesses.216 Universities' business-like attributes include
managing investment funds, collective bargaining, securing land and
building permits, and satisfying ongoing business debts.217 If a Boys'
Club charging a nominal fee,218 and a non-profit home-owners' associa-
tion2 11 are considered businesses under the Unruh Act, a university that
has invested millions of dollars and employed a large staff, would defi-
nitely constitute a business establishment.220
2. Universities arbitrarily discriminate by providing unequal services
to gay and lesbian students
Career Placement Centers provide a service to students-linking
them to employment opportunities in the private and public sectors. 2
Career Placement Centers also provide a centralized location containing
information to help students maximize their efficiency in job hunting
222
212. Marina Point, 30 Cal. 3d at 732, 640 P.2d at 122, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
213. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1991).
214. Marina Point, 30 Cal. 3d at 732, 640 P.2d at 122, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
215. See Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 952.
216. Comment, Divestiture Resolutions: University Director Liability Under the Emerging
Corporate Standard, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 261, 279-80 (1980); see also J. O'NEILL & S. BAR-
NETr, COLLEGES AND CORPORATE CHANGE: MERGER, BANKRUPTCY AND CLOSURE 2
(1980) (listing similarities between operations of corporations and universities).
217. Comment, supra note 216, at 279-80.
218. See Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 76, 707 P.2d at 214, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
219. See O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796, 662 P.2d 427, 431,
191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1983).
220. Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 952.
221. GOLDEN GATE UNIV., supra note 1, at 42; STANFORD UNIV., supra note 2, at 47;
UNIVERsrrY OF CAL., Los ANGELES, supra note 1, at 39.
222. See GOLDEN GATE UNIV., supra note 1, at 42; LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIV., supra
note 2, at 43; STANFORD UNIV., supra note 2, at 47.
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and to facilitate their access to employers.223 Moreover, Career Place-
ment Centers provide a service to employers by helping them fulfill their
hiring needs.224
Although not specifically mentioned in the Unruh Act, universities
and their Career Placement Centers should be subject to its provisions.
Given the important role of educational institutions in our society225 and
the large number of persons who avail themselves of the opportunity to
go to college,226 California's public policy of eliminating arbitrary dis-
crimination from community life would be greatly hindered if universi-
ties were exempt from the Unruh Act's provisions.
In addition to the business establishment requirement, successful
plaintiffs must also show that they were offered unequal services.227 If a
plaintiff cannot establish that universities arbitrarily discriminate by pro-
viding unequal services, the Unruh Act will not apply. Universities may
raise three arguments to support the contentions that they do not provide
services unequally or arbitrarily discriminate. This Comment will dis-
cuss them in turn.
a. argument 1: universities provide equal services because they arrange
interviews between military recruiters and homosexual
students
Universities may argue that they provide equal services to gay and
lesbian students if they arrange interviews for them with the military.225
This practice allows both heterosexual and homosexual students to have
the same number of interviews with the same employers. While this ap-
pears to satisfy quantitative equality, the quality of the interviews is une-
qual.229 The service offered by Career Placement Centers is to assist
223. See GOLDEN GATE UNIV., supra note 1, at 42; LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIV., supra
note 2, at 43; STANFORD UNIv., supra note 2, at 47; UNIVERSITY OF CAL., DAVIS, supra note
2, at 20; UNIVERSITY OF CAL., Los ANGELES, supra note 1, at 39.
224. Adams, Yale Placement Center Ups Ante for Firm Interviews on Campus, Nat'l L.J.,
Sept. 28, 1987, at 4, col. 5.
225. See AMERICAN EDUCATION 4-9 (R. Long ed. 1984).
226. See CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, STATS AND FACTS:
THE CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES 2 (1983) (enrollment in community colleges quad-
rupled between 1960 and 1983 reaching over 1,000,000 students enrolled per year); THE CALI-
FORNIA STATE UNIVERSrrY AND COLLEGES 3 (1983) (over 315,000 total students enrolled in
the 19 campus system).
227. See Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 86, 707 P.2d at 221, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
228. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 89 n.l 1 (3d Cir. 1986).
229. Cf. Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 288, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984) (restaurant
found to have violated Unruh Act for refusing to sit lesbian couple in booth reserved for
heterosexual couples); Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 45 Cal. App. 2d 283, 114 P.2d 27
(1941) (racetrack violated public accommodations statute by not allowing blacks in club house
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students in securing employment.2 30 If universities know that open
homosexuals will be denied the opportunity of employment with the mil-
itary, regardless of their qualifications, the service offered will be illusory.
The purpose of Career Placement Centers is to provide access to job op-
portunities, not just to provide interviews.2 3' Career Placement Centers
that allow the military to interview on campus are not, therefore, provid-
ing homosexual students equal access to job opportunities. By allowing
military participation in on-campus recruiting, universities effectively
deny approximately ten percent 232 of the students who fund the Career
Placement Centers an opportunity made available to other students.
b. argument 2: universities do not discriminate, the military
discriminates
Universities may concede that homosexuals are discriminated
against, but they will allege that it is only the military that discriminates.
Universities may argue that they should not be held liable for those ac-
tions taken by the military that contradict the purposes of the Unruh
Act. Presently, there is no case law on whether liability may be imputed
to third parties under the Unruh Act. Courts, however, have construed
civil rights statutes as allowing imputed liability.23 3
Under federal civil rights statutes,2 34 courts have imputed liability in
even though blacks were allowed in all other seating areas). In Rolon, the restaurant did not
refuse to serve the lesbian couple. Id. It merely refused to seat them in a particular booth. Id.
Had the couple agreed to sit at another table, the restaurant would have served them from the
same menu and at the same prices as all of its other customers. Essentially it would have
treated them equally. Id. The policy which excluded lesbian couples from certain booths,
even though they were entitled to all other services offered by the restaurant, violated the
Unruh Act's requirement of equal provision of services. Id.
The above cases are examples of how even indirect discrepancies in service are prohibited
under the Unruh Act. Like the restaurant in Rolon, universities offer most of the same serv-
ices to their heterosexual and homosexual students, even with respect to the military. Univer-
sities have held themselves out as providing Career Placement Centers to assist all students in
securing employment. See supra note 223. When universities set up interviews between homo-
sexual students and the military, they do not assist these students in securing employment.
230. UNIVERSITY OF CAL., DAVIS, supra note 2, at 20.
231. See supra note 223.
232. See R. ISAY, BEING HOMOSEXUAL: GAY MEN AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT 14 (1989)
(about ten percent of population between ages of sixteen and sixty-five is estimated to have
been exclusively homosexual for at least three-year period).
233. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978); Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989); Bordanaro
v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (Ist Cir. 1989); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, 648
F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1980).
234. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982-1983 (1988). Section 1982 reads in pertinent part: "All citizens of
the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property."
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a variety of situations. 235 This type of liability, however, may not be im-
puted solely on the basis of respondeat superior.2 36 To impute liability,
some element of cause must be attributable to the defendant. 237 The rele-
vant question is whether universities have in any way caused the discrim-
ination against gay and lesbian students.
Cause sufficient to impute liability has been found in a number of
situations. In Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District,238 the plaintiff
filed a sexual harassment claim against a teacher2 3 9 pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.24 The federal appellate court allowed the plaintiff to join mem-
bers of the school board as defendants.241 The court found that the
school board could be held liable for adopting and maintaining a policy
of reckless indifference to instances of known or suspected sexual abuse
of students by teachers.24 2 The court held that the plaintiff established
causation by showing that the school officials encouraged a climate to
flourish where violations of the statute occurred.2 43
In Bordanaro v. McLeod,24 the plaintiffs were brutally beaten by
Everett, Massachusetts police officers.245 Police officers broke down the
door of a motel room and beat the occupants until one died; the others
246were unconscious. The plaintiffs brought suit against the city of Ever-
Id. § 1982. Section 1983 provides that any person who, under color of any custom or usage of
any state or territory "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable .. " Id. § 1983.
235. See infra notes 238-59 and accompanying text.
236. Monell, 436 U.S. at 491. The language of section 1983 should not be construed
to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Con-
gress did specifically provide that A's Tort became B's liability if B 'caused' A to
subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend [section] 1983 liability
to attach where such causation was absent.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 492.
237. Id
238. 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1988).
239. Id. at 722.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
241. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 722.
242. Id. at 724-25.
243. Id. at 730. Sufficient causation was established to deny defendants' motion to dismiss
where defendants' actions could be construed by a jury as "encourag[ing] a climate to flourish
where innocent girls are victimized." Id. (citation omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on the testimony of another student who had complained of sexual harassment
and who had been told not to tell her parents. Id. at 727. In addition, no notes were made in
the files of teachers who had been accused by students of sexual misconduct. Id.
244. 871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989).
245. Id. at 1154.
246. Id. at 1153-54. The incident occurred when an off-duty police officer got into a fight at
a bar. After losing the fight, he called for police reinforcements. When the police returned
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ett, the Mayor and the Chief of Police under section 1983.247 The prac-
tice of breaking down doors without a warrant had become so
widespread and flagrant that the Chief of Police and the Mayor were
found to have had constructive knowledge of the violations.248 Causa-
tion was satisfied in this case by proving that the Chief of Police had
constructive knowledge of civil rights violations2 49 and that the viola-
tions were a moving force behind the plaintiff's injury.2"'
Liability for the racial discrimination of an employee was extended
to the employer in Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel.251 The plaintiff,
a black man, was denied office space on the grounds that there were no
vacancies. 252 White friends of the plaintiff, however, were shown a va-
cant office when they went to the establishment the next day.25 3 The
plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1982.254 The defend-
ant argued that the desk clerk who misled the plaintiff may have discrim-
inated, but her discrimination could not be imputed to the owner.25 The
court found that discriminatory conduct on the part of a rental agent is
attributable to the owner of a motel, apartment complex or other public
housing facility.256
Under these standards, a successful plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendant had constructive knowledge of the violations; (2) the defend-
ant encouraged a climate where violations of the statute would occur;
and, (3) the violations were a moving force behind the plaintiff's injury.
First, universities could be shown to have constructive knowledge of
these Unruh Act violations due to the publicized nature of this issue.
Alternatively, students could put universities on actual notice by filing
formal complaints. Second, in allowing the military to interview on cam-
pus, universities do not simply fail to act; rather, they invite the military
on campus and provide them with services.257 By inviting the military
wielding night sticks, clubs, bats and tire irons, the plaintiffs fled into the nearby motel room
where the beatings occurred. Id.
247. Id. at 1154.
248. Id. at 1157.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1158. The court found it reasonable for a jury to conclude that there was super-
visory encouragement, condonation and even acquiescence in the unconstitutional practice.
Id. at 1157.
251. 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980).
252. Id. at 550.
253. Id.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 1982. This statute makes it illegal to deny rights in the leasing, purchase
or sale of property on the basis of race. Id.
255. Phiffer, 648 F.2d at 551.
256. Id. at 552.
257. See Adams, supra note 224, at 4.
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onto their campuses, universities support and encourage a climate where
the right of gays and lesbians to be free from discrimination is vio-
lated.2"8 Third, universities' utilization of the military in their placement
services causes the violation of gay and lesbian students' right to full and
equal services. This causal link is highlighted by universities' absolute
right to expel the military from their recruiting programs.25 9  Under
these standards, universities violate the Unruh Act and, therefore, should
be held liable.
c argument 3: the military's discrimination is legal; therefore, liability
can not be imputed to universities
Universities may argue that the cases discussed in the previous sec-
tion are inapposite because the military, unlike the primary actors in
those cases, does not violate the law. Universities might posit two dis-
tinct reasons why the Unruh Act should not bar the military from dis-
criminating against homosexuals. First, universities may argue that the
military does not arbitrarily discriminate against gays and lesbians.2 6
Second, universities may contend that the military is not bound by state
anti-discrimination laws. Thus, universities may claim that the mili-
tary's protection from the Unruh Act extends to shield universities from
liability.
Extension of the military's immunity from state law, however, is not
warranted. The first prong of the universities' argument, asserting that
no arbitrary discrimination occurs, does not take into account that uni-
versities themselves provide unequal services. 26 1 Although the military
has allegedly provided a reasonable basis for its discrimination, 262 univer-
sities would still be required to show that they also had rational reasons
to offer unequal services.263
258. See Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 75-76, 707 P.2d at 214, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52; supra notes
221-27.
259. H.R. REP. No. 1149, supra note 124, at 79-80 (1972).
260. A defendant may escape liability by showing that the inequality of service was based
on a reasonable regulation. See Marina Point, 30 Cal. 3d at 737, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal.
Rptr. at 506; In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217, 474 P.2d 992, 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 32 (1970).
The military's anti-homosexual regulations have been held to be sufficiently rational to pass
equal protection analysis. See, eg., Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625, 627 (C.D. Cal.
1987). Universities may argue that the military's policy, therefore, is not arbitrary as defined
by the Unruh Act.
261. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 5; see also 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(H)(1)(a) (1990) (Defense
Department's statement that homosexuality is incompatible with military service).
263. See Marina Point, 30 Cal. 3d at 737, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (landlord's
showing that children are more boisterous than adults was not rationally related to exclusion
of families with children from apartment complex); Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 217, 474 P.2d at 100, 90
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Universities could argue that they want to provide every possible job
opportunity to their students. Coupled with this concern is the fact that
the military's discrimination is legal. 2" Universities could contend,
therefore, that allowing recruiting by a legally discriminating employer,
for the legitimate concern of providing students with job opportunities,
does not constitute arbitrary discrimination. This argument focuses on
the importance of the job placement services that are being offered un-
equally. 265 In essence, this argument asserts that heterosexual students'
interest in obtaining military job placement outweighs homosexual stu-
dents' right to the provision of equal services. Under this type of balanc-
ing test, important services offered to the majority require less
justification for their unequal provision. Arbitrary discrimination, how-
ever, does not focus on the importance of services provided to an en-
franchised group, but rather on the reasons for the disparate
treatment.266 Unlike the military, which has been found to have an over-
Cal. Rptr. at 32 (asking patron to leave shopping mall because of his unconventional dress was
not reasonable regulation rationally related to services performed). See supra notes 221-27 for
a discussion of why universities that allow the military to interview on-campus independently
provide unequal services.
264. See supra note 5.
265. Barring the military from on-campus recruiting does not deny heterosexual students
the opportunity to work for the military. Students are not foreclosed from initiating contact
with the military for employment purposes. Also, the military may actively reach interested
students through avenues other than Career Placement Centers.
266. Courts holding that discriminatory rules or regulations were reasonable under the Un-
ruh Act have rested their decisions on one of two factors. First, a regulation may stand if the
purposes underlying the disparate treatment is based on a particular and specialized need. See,
e.g., Marina Point, 30 Cal. 3d at 742-43, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 510 (age qualifica-
tions in housing development specifically designed to provide for specialized needs of older
people are reasonable); Ross v. Forest Lawn Memorial Park, 153 Cal. App. 3d 988, 993, 203
Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1984) (policy permitting private funerals by which punk rockers were
excluded from memorial service at deceased's parents' request was reasonable in light of spe-
cialized nature of service). Second, courts may allow disparities in treatment when the une-
qual services do not perpetuate irrational stereotypes and promote a socially desirable goal.
See, eg., Starkman v. Mann Theaters Corp., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1491, 1497-98, 278 Cal. Rptr.
543, 547 (1991); Koire v. Metro Carwash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 34-35, 707 P.2d 195, 201, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 133, 139 (1985).
Career Placement Centers provide their services to all students. Although heterosexual
students may benefit from on-campus military recruiting, denial of job opportunities to homo-
sexual students is not justified by an overriding specialized need of heterosexual students. Fur-
thermore, the job placement services are neither intimate nor specialized in that equal
provision of services to homosexual students would infringe upon a sensitive right of hetero-
sexual students. Exclusion of gays and lesbians from full and equal participation in Career
Placement services also promotes the irrational stereotype that they are not deserving of the
same opportunities as heterosexual students. The policy of allowing the military to interview
on campus, therefore, would not be a reasonable regulation under the Unruh Act.
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riding national security interest,267 California universities have no legiti-
mate reason to distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual
students in the provision of services.268
The second prong of the universities' argument asserts that because
the military policy has been sustained by the courts,26 9 there is no liabil-
ity to be imputed to the universities, which merely aid in legal discrimi-
nation. This argument, however, fails to examine the underpinnings of
why the military is exempt from the Unruh Act. It is not because Cali-
fornia condones discrimination based on sexual orientation, but rather
because the military is shielded by the preemption principle.270 Califor-
nia universities do not enjoy this same protection and, therefore, they
should be bound by state law.271
The legality of the military's discrimination does not necessitate a
finding that universities cannot be liable. The California Attorney Gen-
eral found that universities that were sufficiently connected to fraternities
that discriminated on the basis of race, could be held liable for civil rights
violations despite the fact that fraternities were shielded from such liabil-
ity.272 Although the fraternities' discrimination was lawful, universities
that supplied such fraternities with benefits could still violate the law.273
This holding rested on the fact that universities themselves were not free
to discriminate on the basis of race.274 By supporting legally discrimina-
tory fraternal organizations, universities indirectly participated in racial
discrimination.275 Universities' indirect roles in other parties' legal dis-
267. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 566 (9th
Cir. 1990).
268. In addition to Unruh Act guarantees, many California universities have non-discrimi-
nation policies expressly prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.
STANFORD UNIV., supra note 2, at 1; UNIVERSITY OF CAL., BERKELEY, supra note 2, at 45;
UNIVERSITY OF CAL., DAVIS, supra note 2, at 2; UNIVERSrrY OF CAL., HASTINGS COLLEGE
OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 47; UNIVERSITY OF CAL., Los ANGELES, supra note 1, at 47.
269. See supra note 5. See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (decisions regarding
composition, training, equipping and control of military forces are best left with legislative and
executive branches of government).
270. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (fields of dominant federal interest
will preclude enforcement of state laws on same subject). The power to raise a militia is a
dominant federal interest, expressly granted to Congress in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cI. 16.
271. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (state universities may be sued).
272. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 264, 275 (1959). Private associations such as fraternities were le-
gally allowed to restrict their membership on the basis of race. Id. "Certainly under the
present law a state can constitutionally incorporate a fraternity which restricts its membership
on the basis of race." Id. at 272.
273. Id. at 272-73.
274. Id. at 273.
275. Id. The Attorney General held that if universities maintained control over the frater-
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crimination, however, were found to be impermissible.27 6 This holding
partially rested on California's public policy against discrimination.2 77
The Unruh Act would bar universities from directly discriminating
against gays and lesbians.278
Universities that allow the military to recruit on-campus, support
discrimination that is legal when practiced by the military, yet illegal
when practiced by universities. Military recruiters, like fraternities, re-
ceive support in the form of services offered by universities.279 The fact
that the military may legally discriminate against gays and lesbians,
therefore, does not necessarily shield universities from liability for their
violations of the Unruh Act.280
The relationship between the military and universities, with respect
to recruiting, is unique. It is the military that actively discriminates
against gays and lesbians; however, universities hold military recruiting
out as a part of their own service. The service offered by universities,
nities and supplied them with assistance, there would be "little doubt but that such a relation-
ship with fraternities which restrict membership on the basis of race, color, creed, or religion
would be invalid as against public policy . Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. The holding alternatively rested on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Aid to discriminatory fraternities from state universities would constitute state
action and, therefore, be prohibited by the United States Constitution. Id. at 272-73.
278. See supra notes 36-79 and accompanying text.
279. Fraternities may receive university support in housing, use of school facilities, and
financial support. Horowitz, Discriminatory Fraternities at State Universities, 25 S. CAL. L.
REv. 289, 290 (1952). The services provided to military recruiters may include the provision
of data base information on students, rooms for interviews, and administrative assistance in
arranging interviews. See STANFORD UNIV., supra note 2, at 47; UNIVERSITY OF CAL., HAS-
TINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 20; Adams, supra note 224, at 4, col. 5.
280. Universities might argue that if liability were imposed for their cooperation with the
military, this would prohibit them from cooperating with firms which have instituted affirma-
tive action hiring programs. The only difference, they would argue, is the group being offered
unequal services. The two situations, however, are distinguishable. Affirmative action hiring
practices by a firm would not be violative of California's public policy. See Price v. Civil
Service Comm'n of Sacramento, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 270, 604 P.2d 1365, 1373, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475,
483 (1980). In that case, an employer's attempt to remedy past discrimination, by voluntarily
adopting a race conscious hiring program was held to be a positive step in helping to create
equal job opportunities to historically excluded groups. Id. at 273, 604 P.2d at 1375, 161 Cal.
Rptr. at 485. The military's discrimination, however, does not constitute a positive step to-
ward curing past discrimination. Universities are allowed to take race into account in admis-
sions decisions. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-20 (1978).
Universities are also allowed to institute affirmative action programs to cure their own past
discrimination. See Price, 26 Cal. 3d at 270, 604 P.2d at 1373, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 483. Universi-
ties could not offer unequal services to their gay and lesbian students, however, since this
would not constitute a step toward effecting the underlying purposes of California's public
policy.
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therefore, is inherently unequal.2 81 This situation is different from print-
ing a business printing military recruiting posters or a hotel renting
rooms to the armed services for conducting recruiting interviews.282 In
each of those instances, the business furthers the military's discrimina-
tory recruiting practices, yet neither the printer nor the hotel directly
provides unequal services. While they may be aiding the military in its
discriminatory practices, the printer and the hotel owner would not vio-
late the Unruh Act unless they arbitrarily offered unequal services to
their own customers.283 In contrast, universities that sponsor military
recruiters provide their heterosexual students employment opportunities
that are denied to gay and lesbian students.
IV. PROPOSAL
While this Comment is primarily designed to be a tool for potential
litigants wishing to challenge California universities' cooperation with
military recruiters, the underlying purpose is to keep California universi-
ties from aiding in military recruiting discrimination. This purpose
could be accomplished by methods other than litigation. First, this Com-
ment may persuade universities to voluntarily ban military on-campus
recruiting until the military changes its discriminatory policy.284 Sec-
ond, if the problem persists, this Comment calls upon either the Califor-
nia Legislature or interested citizen groups to request that the Attorney
General write an advisory opinion setting forth the legality of coopera-
tion between universities and military recruiters. The Comment also ar-
gues for the reversal of the decision in United States v. City of
Philadelphia.
V. CONCLUSION
By providing Career Placement Center programs, universities prof-
fer a valuable service to their students. Once that burden is undertaken,
281. See supra notes 221-27.
282. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 88 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986).
283. See Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 712, 715, 234 P.2d 969, 971 (1951).
284. The Association of American Law Schools has passed a resolution requiring employers
wishing to recruit on campus to sign non-discrimination policies which include prohibitions on
sexual orientation discrimination. Nat'l L.J., supra note 3, at 17, col. 1. Those schools that do
not comply with this policy risk losing their accreditation. Id. In response to this policy, the
University of Chicago Law School has barred the military from utilizing its placement facilities
until they change their discriminatory policy. Id. The University of California, Los Angeles
Law School allows military recruiting to take place on campus, but only because they are
forced to by the university. Id. In addition to these actions, students are taking an active role
in demanding an end to universities' compliance with military discrimination. See supra note
3.
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universities should be required to abide by the laws of the state in which
they are located. When universities allow the military to interview on
campus they provide students with access to military job openings. The
military practices discriminatory policies regarding homosexuals and
universities facilitate certain job openings to heterosexual, but not homo-
sexual, students. Thus, the services provided by universities are unequal
and, in California, violate the Unruh Act. In this context, the Unruh Act
would not be preempted by federal law because: (1) discrimination in the
provision of services is a field traditionally regulated by the state; (2)
Congress did not show a "clear and manifest" intent to preempt state law
with the passage of section 606(a); and, (3) the Unruh Act does not actu-
ally conflict with section 606(a). California's valid interest in purging
arbitrary discrimination from community life should bar universities
from facilitating military homophobia.
Steven Wyllie*
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